

# The First Armeno-Mongol Negotiations

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*Translated by Robert Bedrosian*

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THE FIRST PERIOD OF diplomatic negotiations between the Cilician Armenian kingdom and the Mongol empire is closely connected with the well-known battle of Chmankatuk which took place in 1243 between the armies of the Mongol conquerors and the Seljuq sultanate of Iconium.

Already in 1235, at the Mongol khans' court in Karakorum, the question of the creation of a Mongol world empire had been discussed. To implement the affirmative decision of the assembly (*quriltai*), a huge army under the leadership of Chingis khan's grandson Batu khan was sent to conquer Russia and countries in southeastern Europe. At the same time another Mongol army under the command of the noted general Charmaghan moved through Persia toward the Transcaucasus. In a short while Charmaghan conquered the Transcaucasian countries of Armenia, Georgia and Albania, and made them subject of the Mongol empire. This Mongol expedition under Charmaghan was not the first to appear in Transcaucasia. Previously, in December 1220, a reconaissance army of 20,000 strong, organized by Chigis khan, under the leadership of Jebe *nuin* and Subudei *bahatur*, invaded the Transcaucasus. This reconaissance army fought and defeated a combined Armenian-Georgian force of 60,000 on the Xunan plain. Considering their work finished after this battle, and avoiding further fighting, the Mongols crossed the main range of the Caucasus through the narrow pass at

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Shirvan and invaded the north Caucasus. It was there in 1223 that they defeated the united armies of the Russians and Kipchaks at the battle of Kalka.

After this victory the Mongols did not appear in the Transcaucasus for some while, despite the testimony of some Armenian historians who recall skirmishes there during this period (1). It is noteworthy that the Mongol troops recalled by these historians did not have as their aim the conquest of the Transcaucasus. They appeared in the area pursuing the Khwarezmian shah Jalal od-Din Mangubirdi. The latter, avoiding battle with the Mongols, had invaded the Transcaucasus with a huge army of Turkic brigands. For almost seven years Jalal od-Din ceaselessly waged war, sometimes against the local princedoms, sometimes against the Mongol troops pursuing him.

Charmaghan on the other hand came with a different goal in mind. According to the decision of the Mongol **quriltai**, he was sent to **subdue** the entire Transcaucasus. At the head of one hundred thousand Mongol troops Charmaghan swept over the Transcaucasus like a raging whirlwind and in a short time conquered Armenia, (Caucasian) Albania, and Georgia. This time the Mongols moved with their families and with all their possessions, as Kirakos Ganjakec'i testifies (2). At that time, Queen Rusudan (1223-1247) sat on the Georgian throne. During her reign the centralized Georgian kingdom (which at that time included Armenia) was greatly weakened.

In addition to the destruction caused by the wars which were waged against sultan Jalal od-Din's army, the country experienced internal disorders and discord. This partially explains why there was no serious organized resistance to the Mongol invasion of the Transcaucasian countries in such a short time. To facilitate the conquest, Charmaghan divided the entire area among his commanders who conquered by sword and fire and made subject to conquer the Transcaucasian conquered by sword and fire and made subject to themselves Georgia, Albania and Armenia. Numerous families fled from Greater Armenia to Cilician Armenia taking with them lurid impressions of the savage Mongol's terrors and atrocities.

The chief commander of the Mongol forces, Charmaghan, became deaf during the Transcaucasian campaign, was removed from his office (3) and replaced by Bachu **nuin** (4). The latter moved toward the Seljuq state of Iconium with a large army. His first victim was the city of Karin (Erzurum), which was besieged in autumn, 1242. According to Grigor Aknerc'i, the Mongols captured Karin after a seige lasting two months (5). Before taking the city the Mongols sent a delegation requesting surrender, but the city's defenders not only did not agree to this, but they insulted Bachu **nuin**'s messengers and expelled them from the city. Enraged, the Mongols attacked and took the city, looting and pillaging it and putting its population to the sword. In addition to destroying this city they also ravaged many provinces of the sultan of Rum (6).

After the conquest and plundering of Karin, the Mongols did not push their expedition into the depths of the land. Since cold weather was approaching they returned to the warm and suitable Mughan valley to winter there (4).

The sultan of Iconium, Ghiyath ad-Din Kai Khsrov II (1237-1247), having tasted the bitterness of the Mongol conquerors, applied himself to stringent war preparations. Not only did he increase the size of his own force, but he also enlisted mercenaries from neighboring states. In his army, according to historians, were

many Greek, Egyptian and "Frankish" warriors. Further, he invited knights from the Crusader states—states inimical to him—to form mounted regiments. Het'um the Historian says that he promised gifts to all "and thus with a great crowd of men assembled, he moved to the place frequented by the Tatars" (8). The same historian records that the number of invited Latin cavalry alone reached 2,000 (9). This testimony of Het'um is corroborated by Abu'l Farradj (Bar Hebraeus) who wrote that sultan Ghiyath ad-Din "gathered a great army and hired with gold horsemen from Aleppo, from the Franks, Mataye and Greeks. The lord of Amasia and Melik Ghazi, lord of Mayfarzin, also promised that they would come in assistance" (10). As Abu'l Farradj wrote, the sultan requested aid likewise from the Cilician Armenian kingdom: "Kostandin Payl came to Caesarea and was received with much honor and received many presents. He promised to go and to assemble many Armenians to come to the sultan's aid" (11).

The sultan of Rum with a huge army moved towards the Mongols. He sent special messengers to Bachu nuin and demanded that he leave the kingdom of Iconium. He threatened Bachu with his might, saying: "My cities are countless, my forces numberless" (12). Kirakos Ganjakec'i continues, noting that the sultan boasted vainly. Grigor Aknerc'i says that Bachu nuin, the commender of the Mongol forces, successful in battle, (13) merely insulted the sultan, saying, "Victory will be to whomever God grants it" (14).

Contemporary historians gave differing estimates of the size of the sultan's army. A Georgian chronicler placed the army at 400,000 (15), which is patently an exaggeration while the Seljuq apologist Ibn Bibi lowered the figure to 70,000 (16) which is also improbable. William of Rubruck estimated 200,000 (17). Kirakos Ganjakec'i does not give a figure but merely says the army was a "countless multitude" (18). Het'um the Historian describes the army in the same general way, saying that the sultan brought as many troops to battle as he was able (19). Grigor Aknerc'i numbers the sultan's army at 160,000 which seems most likely correct (20).

The contemporary historians likewise provided different estimates of the Mongol army's size. William of Rubruck has 10,000 (21) while Het'um the Historian has 30,000 (22). Some sources provide no statistics simply noting that the Mongol, army was three times smaller than the sultan's army (23). In our opinion the sultan's force was probably 160—180,000 opposed to 65—70,000 Mongol soldiers.

According to Grigor Aknerc'i, the decisive battle between the Mongols and the sultan of Iconium's army took place "on the level plain which lies between the town of Karin and that of Erznkayin (Erzinjan)" (24), in the Ova plain (25), near the village of Chamankatuk (the present-day village of Chimin) (26). Rashid ad-Din (27) and Ibn Bibi (28) called the battleground Kose-dagh (Bald mountain), which is most likely one of the mountains around Chmankatuk (29).

Armenian historians such as Kirakos Ganjakec'i, Grigor Aknerc'i, Vardan Aravelc'i and Het'um the Historian describe the war between the army of the sultan's elder son Shalve who was fighting against the Mongols' left-wing "turned back the Tatars and killed many of them" (30). But the Armeno-Georgian forces fighting from forward positions in the Mongol army crushed the sultan's army and put it to flight. Aknerc'i wrote: "The Armenian and Georgian cavalry who were

with him put to flight the right-wing of the sultan's army, severing the heads of many emirs and notables" (31).

K. Ganjakec'i attributed the Mongols' success to Bachu nuin's "deep knowledge" (32). So that the Armeno-Georgian divisions would not betray him, Bachu placed them in the front lines. The Mongols followed after, with their bows and arrows, putting the enemy to flight (33) (34). The success of the Mongol conquerors at Chamankatuk is explained by the fact that they employed military techniques superior to those used by the Seljuqs. The Mongol arsenal included bombs, crossbows, and various rock-hurling and wall-smashing machinery.

Another reason for the Mongols' success was their use of foreign contingents in their front lines. Plano Carpini records interesting information about this, noting that the Mongols forced their captives to fight in the front and to carry the victory. If they fought poorly, a death sentence faced them; on the other hand, if they were victors many of them would be elevated even to the rank of commander (35). This is the very manner in which the Mongols dealt with the Armeno-Georgian contingents in their midst. Those who tried to retreat were annihilated. Armenian historians speak of the Mongols' deeds at Chmankatuk: "What they did was worthy of weeping and lamentation not only for the sake of rational beings, but for dumb animals, for the mountains and fields which they bathed in blood and tears" (36). Many other documents (37) and colophons (38) testify to the Mongols' savagery at Chmankatuk.

Yet the total defeat of the sultan of Iconium, Ghiyath ad-Din, was not the final result of the battle of Chmankatuk. Certainly a part of his forces was crushed, but the sultan himself with troops faithful to him, withdrew to the inner reaches of the country, with the aim of organizing resistance to the Mongols in the future. Historians explain this move of the sultan by the fact that he doubted the loyalty of his military commanders and therefore left the field of battle, "narrowly escaping with his life he left his throne and baggage there and fled" (39). Grigor Aknerc'i speaks of the "duplicity of the emirs who wanted to submit to the Mongols" (40).

The sultan's flight was so sudden that even Bachu nuin, the Mongol general, was suspicious and fearing a ruse, ordered watchmen to guard the tents (41).

When Bachu nuin's scouts had verified that the sultan had indeed fled, the Mongols began to capture his villages and cities. They began to "destroy many provinces and to collect gold and silver, costly garments, camels, horses, mules and countless livestock" (42). Thus the battle of Chmankatuk in 1243 had decisive significance for the existence of the Turko-Seljuq state in Lesser Asia. The Mongols' victory against sultan Ghiyath ad-Din finally destroyed the independence of the Seljuq kingdom of Iconium and made it tributary to the Mongol empire.

The fate of the Cilician Armenian kingdom was also tied to the outcome of the battle of Chmankatuk. Throughout the battle, the Het'umids carefully studied the play of forces in order to orient themselves toward either the sultanate or toward the Mongols. When the enormous army of the sultanate was defeated, the Cilician Armenian kingdom had no other option than to begin negotiating with the Mongol conquerors. The need for an ally was felt especially strongly at this time since on the south Cilicia was under constant threat of attack from inimical Muslim states. Thus, once the outcome of Chmankatuk was clear Cilician political functionaries lost no time meeting with the Mongol command and expressing their submission.

This aspect of Het'umid foreign policy benefitted both the land and the people, for by this time the large victorious Mongol army had reached the borders of Cilicia. As Professor Mik'ayelyan vividly put it, "Not simply sparks, but the flames of the fire itself had reached Cilician Armenia's borders" (43).

The thousands of Armenians who had fled to Cilicia from Greater Armenia to escape the Mongol barbarians' sword, described in detail to their countrymen the Mongols' savagery and cruelty, their injustices and terror. Aware of the damage the Mongols could wreak in Cilicia, and taking into consideration also the defeat of Ghiyath ad-Din, the Het'umids immediately sent a delegation to the Mongols to open negotiations. In submitting to the Mongols the Het'umids recognized too that the wars waged against the Near Eastern Crusader state by the Iconium and Egyptian sultanates would be terminated sooner or later, and that the small Christian kingdom of Cilicia—surrounded by hostile Muslim states—would become the next victim. The fact that until that time the sultanates had been unable to overthrow the Cilician kingdom is explained by the careful and flexible policies adopted by the Het'umids vis-a-vis their Muslim neighbors. For example, the Het'umids strived to establish friendly neighborly relations with Sultan Aladin. After Aladin's death the Het'umids pursued the same policy with the former's son, sultan Ghiyath ad-Din Kai Khosrov II (1237-1247) signing a treaty with him and maintaining friendly relations. As Kirakos Ganjakec'i testifies, Kostandin Payl "established friendship and unity with the sultan of Rum" (44). Armenian historians characterize the Het'umid foreign policy toward neighboring states as peaceloving. Kostandin Payl "treated thus with all the surrounding nations and made peace on all sides" (45). Evidence of the peaceloving policy of the Het'umids are the bilingual coins struck by King Het'um I in the capital, Sis, which bear the names of Het'um and Ghiyath ad-Din, testimonies of Armeno-Seljuq friendship. Therefore when the Mongol threat to Iconium became evident, the sultan considered his relations with the Het'umids and appealed to Kostandin Payl with a request for military assistance. Of course the Het'umids did not accede to the request since they knew that the sultan's friendship with the Armenians would not last long. This was clear since many Armenian feudatories already had united with the Crusaders and were fighting against the Muslim states. Taking all of these factors into consideration, not only did the Het'umids not aid the sultan, but further they sent a delegation to the Mongols to express their submission.

Kostandin Payl himself headed the Cilician Armenian delegation. He was accompanied by the commander-in-chief of the Cilician Armenian forces, Smbat Sparapet, and by the vartapet Simon Asori. Kirakos Ganjakec'i wrote about this: "When he saw that the sultan was defeated at the hands of the Mongols, he sent ambassadors and valuable gifts to make a vow of peace and to stand in obedience to them" (46). Het'um the Historian confirms this notice of Ganjakec'i: "When lord Het'um, king of the Armenians saw that the Tatars had cast their yoke over all the kingdoms, provinces, and places up to the kingdom of the Turks, he consulted with his advisors and decided to go in person to the ruler of the Tatars that he more easily find favor behind him and friendship, and be able to arrange a treaty of peace with him" (47).

The question arises, how did it happen that the Armenian delegation was received so well by the Mongols and conducted negotiations so quickly with them?

This circumstance may be explained by the fact that the Mongols had a developed reconaissance service which intelligenced a given country's internal situation, its relations with neighboring states, and the internal contradictions and squables among the country's feudatories even before military operations were initiated. Only following all of these preliminaries did the Mongols conduct negotiations with the representatives of this or that country. The Mongols knew wery well that Cilician Armenia was a small Christian state surrounded by hostile Muslim sultanates. Furthermore during the course of battle the Mongols became convinced that they had not yet overthrown the powerful kingdom of Iconium. They were cut off from their rear and felt the need of having a loyal state at the farthest reaches of the lands conquered by them to protect the borders of their empire. These then were the historico-political preconditions of the Armeno-Mongol negotiations and the factors which assured their success.

Beyond this, those Armenian princes of Greater Armenia who had submitted to the Mongols and were participating in their expeditions played an important role in guaranteeing the success of the negotiations. Among these princes were Grigor, son of Dop', Avag, son of Ivane, Shahnshah, son of Zak'are, and others. The Mongols employed many Greater Armenians as their diplomats, among these the general Prosh, and Vahram Gahec'i. Prior to capturing Caesarea, Bachu nuin had sent Vahram Gegec'i to Ghyath ad-Din for the purpose of negotiating. Grigor Aknerc'i wrote about this: "With great pomp they sent to Caesarea the wise prince Vahram, lord of Gag, by order of Bachu nuin and all the Tatar leaders and with him a Tatar leader with a hundred horsemen" (48).

According to the testimony of historians, many Armenian princes from Greater Armenia participated in the Mongols' expeditions with their private armies. One of these was the prince of Xachen, Hasan Jalal, who brought to the Mongol army "his troops and his kinsmen" (49). It was this very prince of princes of Xachen, Hasan Jalal, who actively participated in the Armeno-Mongol negotiations. It was he who presented to the Mongol commander-in-chief Bachu nuin the first delegation of the Cilician Armenian kingdom. According to Kirakos Ganjakec'i, the Armenian delegation "stood before Bachu nuin and Elt'ina (Altuna) khatun, Charmaghan's wife, and before the other great nobles through the intercession of prince Jalal" (50).

As a result of the Armeno-Mongol negotiations in Caesarea (1243) an agreement was signed according to which Cilician Armenia recognized its dependence on the Mongol empire, was obliged when necessary to supply the Mongol army with provisions and also to place Armenian auxiliary forces at the disposal of the Mongols, if the need arose. Cilician Armenia was also obliged to send a special delegation to the Mongol court in Karakorum to the Great Khan in order to certify this agreement. The Mongol command, in its turn, was obliged to preserve the sovereignty and independence of the Cilician Armenian kingdom and to provide military protection should that state be attacked by its Muslim neighbors.

Thus both Cilician Armenia and the Mongols profited from this treaty: the Armenians found protection, and the Mongols were able to strengthen their position in the Near East. Professor G. Mik'ayelyan is correct when he notes that the treaty with Cilician Armenia was expedient to the Mongols first for the reason that

Cilician Armenia could serve as a serious buffer for protecting them from the attacks of Lesser Asian Mameluks (51). Beyond this, after fortifying Cilicia's borders, the Mongols could later use the kingdom as a base for conquering Syria and nearby areas. These are the political considerations which prompted the Mongols to sign an agreement with Cilician Armenia. Kirakos Ganjakec'i wrote: "They made friendship with the king (of the Armenians) and gave him a document which they called *el-tamgha*, (52) in accordance with their belief" (53).

Immediately after the negotiations, Bachu *nuin* sent a delegation to the Armenian king and demanded that he hand over Ghiyath ad-Din's mother, wife, and daughter who had taken refuge at the Het'umid court. Bachu threatened Het'um I saying that if the latter did not surrender the refugees, "All the friendship you have made with us will be for naught" (54), and the Armenians, "fearing that the Mongols would fill their land, gave them up" (55).

Confirming this testimony of Smbat Sparapet, Kirakos Ganjakec'i describes with what great reluctance Het'um I surrendered his guests to the Mongols. The historian recorded Het'um's words: "Had they asked of me my son Levon instead of them (the guests) it would have been better for me" (56).

Some, like Abu'l Farradj, condemned the Het'umids for this deed (57). Soviet academician Gordlevskii accuses king Hat'um I of crudely violating the norms of eastern hospitality by surrendering his guests to Bachu *nuin* (58). Other orientalist give a different appraisal of Het'um's behavior. For example, K'erovbe Patkanyan writes that by handing over the sultan's family, Het'um both gained Mongol confidence and turned the sultanate on Iconium into his implacable foe (59). The noted academician Uspenskii shares Paykanyan's view. Uspenskii writes that Het'um, by his careful policies, not only ruled more than 45 years in glory and wealth, but also gained the Mongols' confidence and real friendship, through which the Cilician Armenian kingdom preserved its complete independence (60).

Without a doubt, academician Uspenskii has more correctly characterized Cilician Armenia's foreign policy. After completing difficult negotiations with the Mongols, the Het'umids were not about to subject the country to danger and to lose Mongol friendship because of the sultan's family. The question here is not the violation of so-called "eastern hospitality" as Gordlevskii would have it, but rather the very existence of the Cilician Armenian kingdom and its people. For had Het'um not heeded Bachu *nuin*'s command, the country surely would have been ravaged by the Mongols. The far-sighted policy of the Het'umids found its expression in the words of contemporary authors. In one such testimony, written in Sis in 1244 we find: "In such turbulent times we remained in peace like an island, unharmed by the waves, through the care of the learned and brilliant king Het'um" (61). Het'um II corroborates this, saying about the Armeno-Mongol negotiations: "it wonderously saved the people and the land" (62). All of these facts testify that the new course of Het'umid policy was a profound turning point in the foreign policy of the Cilician Armenian kingdom.

Once the basis of an Armeno-Mongol alliance had been formed it was necessary to strengthen it. To achieve this a special measure was approved to send ambassadors to the court of the Mongol khans to continue the negotiations started in Caesarea. In 1246 a special Armenian delegation under the leadership of Smbat Sparapet was sent to Mongolia.

Some scholars believe that Smbat Sparapet did not go to Mongolia but to Batu khan of the Golden Horde. Academician Hakob Manandyan discusses this in detail in his book *Critical Survey of the History of the Armenian People*. Objecting to the views of Grekov and Professor Iakubovskii, Manandyan writes: "After a careful examination of the information in the sources it is not difficult to guess that he (Smbat) in fact, as Maghak'ia the Abbot (*I.E. Grigor Aknerc'i*) noted, went to see Batu Sayinghan of the Golden Horde whom the Mongols named "Sayin khan", that is, "good khan" (63). Subsequently the noted scholar cites the opinion of the Persian historian Juvaini that the sultans of Iconium, Syria, and other lands had visited Batu and received permits from him. He concludes that because "Smbat Sparapet had gone to the Great Khan accompanied by one of sultan Ghiyath ad-Din's sons", Smbat also had journeyed to Batu. Another argument is that Smbat could not have visited Goyuk Khan during 1248-1250 since the latter had died already in 1248. Manandyan continues: "Therefore Smbat appeared before Batu, the founder of the Golden Horde who temporarily served as Great Khan until the time of Mogka's election to that office (1251-1259)" (64).

In our opinion, H. Manandyan's arguments do not suit the facts. First Smbat Sparapet visited Mongolia during Goyuk khan's lifetime, in 1246. King Levon III's son Het'um II testifies to this: "Smbat went to Mongolia in 695 of the Armenian Era (1246-7)" (65). Furthermore it appears from a letter written by Smbat to king Henri Lusignan of Cyprus, that Smbat had gone to Karakorum during 1246-1247 (66). We conclude from this that Smbat visited Mongolia in 1246-1247 and not later in 1248 as Manandyan wrote. The Persian historian Juvaini's statement also does not prove that Smbat went to Batu khan. Juvaini noted: "The sultans of Iconium, Syria, and other countries came to Batu." There is not a single word here about Smbat. According to Manandyan, the above-mentioned sultan of Iconium must have been the son of sultan Ghiyath ad-Din. This supposition is likewise unfounded. For Smbat's contemporary, the Syrian historian Abu'l Farradj (Bar Hebraeus), in his well-known *History of the Dynasties*, clearly states that "The sultan of Rum, Rukn ad-Din, the Constable of Cilician Armenia, brother of the Armenian king, the Georgian crown-prince the senior and junior Davids, and many many ambassadors from Asia and Europe went to Goyuk khan" (67). What is noteworthy here is that Goyuk rather than Batu is plainly referred to. Furthermore the term "Constable" is employed in the text. It should be observed that in his letter to the king of Cyprus, Smbat refers to himself as Constable (Cundstabl) of the Armenians (68). "Gundstabl" is a vulgarized form of the French "Connétable" which means the commander of the army, the **sparapet**. As is known, in 1245 the commander-Constable of the Cilician Armenian army was Smbat Sparapet, who held that office for some 50 years, from 1226 to 1276. Thus in our period the Constable of Cilician Armenia could have been none other than Smbat. In addition, Abu'l Farradj recorded that "the Constable is the brother of the Armenian king", and indeed Smbat was king Het'um I's older brother. The Persian chronicler Rashid ad-Din confirms this important notice of Abu'l Farradj. Rashid ad-Din wrote that many emirs and distinguished men from Khorassan, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Shirvan and elsewhere travelled to see Goyuk khan. Among this company were sultan Rukn ad-Din from Iconium and from Georgia the two Davids (69) whom a Georgian historian called "Ulu David and Narin David" (70). The

presence of the two Davids is important since they were in Karakorum at the same time that Smbat was, as Plano Carpini confirms (71).

H. Manandyan's opinion that "Sayin khan" designated only Batu is also incorrect. A quotation from Tisenhauer based on the Arab sources which refers to Batu as "Sayin khan" cannot serve as conclusive proof of Manandyan's assertion. For there are other testimonies which clearly connect "Sayin khan" not with Batu but with an earlier leader, most probably with Chingis khan or Goyuk khan. A very interesting document cited by the Russian orientalist Berezin in his publication *Yarlighs of the Khans* confirms this (72). In this document, "Sayin khan" refers to the Mongols' first ruler, *i. e.*, Chingis khan, and not to Batu. In addition to these arguments we have other sources which unequivocally reveal that Smbat Sparapet traveled to visit Goyuk and not Batu khan. Het'um II wrote that in 1246 "King Het'um sent his brother paron Smbat Gundstapl to Kiuk (Goyuk) khan" (73). Het'um II's statement is corroborated by as reliable a historian as Kirakos Ganjakec'i: "The pious and Christian-loving king of the Armenians Het'um (Het'um I—A.G.) of Cilicia resided in the city of Sis. Previously he had sent his brother Smbat, his general, to Giug (Goyuk) khan with presents and gifts. And Smbat returned from the khan with honor and with edicts" (74). As we see, this quotation clearly states that king Het'um I sent Smbat Sparapet to Goyuk khan in Mongolia. Finally, the old French text of one of Smbat Sparapet's letters has been preserved. This letter was written to Henri Lusignan, the king of Cyprus, in 1246, from the city of Samarkand (75). We should ask, if Smbat was journeying to Batu, whatever was he doing in Samarkand? Self-evidently Smbat was en route to Mongolia. All of these facts eloquently argue that Smbat Sparapet went not to Batu khan but to the court of Goyuk khan, in Karakorum, Mongolia.

The evidence presented here convincingly demonstrates that the first period of Armeno-Mongol negotiations began in 1243 immediately after the battle of Chmankatuk. From the standpoint of the Armenians, the negotiations had as their aim the signing of a treaty which on the one hand would save the country from the danger threatening it from the Mongols, and on the other hand would preserve Cilician Armenia's freedom and independence from its inimical southern neighbors.

As a consequence of the successful conclusion of the Armeno-Mongol diplomatic negotiations, Cilician Armenia fully realized its aim. By this prudent act of foreign policy the state preserved the country's independence and saved the people from mass extermination.

#### FOOTNOTES TO GALSTYAN

(1) Concerning the wars in the Transcaucasus prior to 1236 see G. Hovsep'yan, *Yishatakarank' Jeragrac'* (Colophons of Manuscripts) vol. A (Antilias, 1951) p. 962; also Matanadaran ms. no. 1973 p. 195a-198b.

(2) Kirakos Ganjakec'i, *Patmut'iwn Hayoc'*, K. Melik'-Ohanjanyan ed. (Erevan, 1961) Hereafter Kirakos.

(3) V.A. Hakobyan, *Minor Chronicles of the XIII-XVIII Centuries*, vol. B (Erevan, 1956) p. 346 (in Arm.)

(4) According to several historians, the Mongols cast lots to select their new commander. Kirakos Ganjakec'i writes: "Replacing Charmaghan who had gone

deaf was a certain commander named Bachu-ghurich. The lot fell to him to be leader" (Kirakos, p. 279).

(5) Grigor Aknerc'i, *The History of the Nation of the Archers*, trans. R. Blake (Cambridge, Mass., 1954) p. 306. Hereafter, Aknerc'i. Kirakos Ganjakec'i also notes a seige but does not specify the date: the Mongols "entered Karin province and besieged T'eodupolis which is now called the city of Karin" (Kirakos, p. 279).

(6) Kirakos, p. 280

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) Het'um Patmich, *Patmut'iwu T'at'arac'* (Venice, 1842) p. 38. Hereafter Het'um.

(9) *Ibid.*

(10) H. Kurdian, *Eriza and Ekegheac' District*, vol. A (Venice, 1953) p. 107 (in Arm.).

(11) *Ibid.*

(12) Kirakos, p.    .

(13) Aknerc'i, p. 308.

(14) Kirakos, p. 281.

(15) V.A. Gordlevskii, *The Government of the Seljuqids in Asia Minor* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1941) p. 36 (in Rus.).

(16) V.A. Gordlevskii, *Selected Works*, vol. I, Historical Works (Moscow, 1960) (in Rus.).

(17) William of Rubruck, *Travels to Eastern Lands*, trans. to Russian and notes by A. Malein (St. Petersburg, 1911) p. 175.

(18) Kirakos, p. 282.

(19) Het'um, p. 38.

(20) Aknerc'i, p. 308.

(21) Gordlevskii, *Selected Works*, vol. I, p. 63.

(22) Het'um, p. 38.

(23) H. Asturian, *History of the Armenians* (Buenos Aires, 1947) p. 176 (in Arm.).

(24) Aknerc'i, p. 308.

(25) A. Alpayajian, *History of Armenian-Caesarea*, vol. A (Cairo, 1937) p. 515 (in Arm.).

(26) Only Kirakos Ganjakec'i records the name Chmankatuk, Kirakos, p. 282.

(27) H. Hakobyan, *Travels*, vol. A (Ereven, 1932) p. 28 (in Arm.).

(28) Gordlevskii, *Selected Works*, vol. I p. 63.

(29) H. Manandyan believes that the battle between the two sides "took place near the town of Chmankatuk which may be the present village of Chimin, some 15-20 kilometers east of Erznka (see H. Manandyan, *Critical Survey of the History of the Armenian People*, vol. 3, Erevan, 1952, p. 215, in Arm.). On the location of Chmankatuk and an explanation of the name see H. Kurdian, *op. cit.*, p. 109 also Brosset, *Deux historiens Armeniens, Kirakos de Gantzac*, t. I (Petersbourg, 1870) p. 140 n.1.

(30) Aknerc'i, p. 308. Prior to the battle of Chmankatuk the sultan of Iconium, Ghiyath ad-Din Kai Khosrov II had sent a large army under the leadership of his son Shalve to halt Mongols' advance.

(31) Aknerc'i, p. 308.

(32) Kirakos, p. 282.

(33) *ibid.* Het'um the Historian also noted the total defeat of Ghiyath ad-Din's men, Het'um, p. 39.

(34) Het'um, p. 39.

(35) Giovanni del Plano Carpini, *History of the Mongols*, edited, introduction

and notes by N.P. Shestina (Moscow, 1957) p. 60 (in Rus.).

(36) *Hawak'umn Patmut'ean Vardanay Vardapeti Lusabaneal Vardan Arawelc'i*, (Venice, 1862) p. 148 (in Arm.).

(37) *Armenian Sources on the Mongols*, drawn from XIII-XVI century manuscripts. Translated from classical Armenian, introduction and notes by A.G. Galstyan (Moscow, 1962) p. 36 (in Rus.).

(38) Matenadaran ms. no. 1973 pp. 195-199.

(39) Kirakos, p. 283.

(40) Aknerc'i, p. 310.

(41) *ibid.*

(42) Kirakos, p. 282.

(43) See G. G. Mik'ayelyan, *History of the Cilician Armenian Government* (Erevan, 1952) p. 297 (in Rus.).

(44) Kirakos, p. 190.

(45) *ibid.*

(46) *Ibid.* p. 285.

(47) Het'um, p. 42.

(48) Aknerc'i, p. 316.

(49) Kirakos, p. 284.

(50) *ibid.* p. 285.

(51) G. Mik'ayelyan, p. 332.

(52) *El-tamgha*—a guarantee of a country's inviolability. H. Manandyan (*Critical Survey...*, vol. 3, p. 216) considers it synonymous with *tamgha*. Patkanov discusses the term in detail, *History of the Mongols according to the Armenian Sources* (St. Petersburg, 1874) p. 135 n.6 (in Rus.) Hereafter Patkanov.

(53) Kirakos, p. 285.

(54) Smbat Sparapet, *Taregirk'* (Paris, 1859) p. 122.

(55) *ibid.*

(56) Kirakos, p. 285.

(57) Victor Langlois in his *Extrait de la chronique de Sempad* (Petersbourg, 1862) p. 29 notes the sultan's mother and daughter but not wife. Smbat wrote that the sultan's mother "took her daughter and fled to Cilicia" (p. 122). Ganjakec'i recalls the mother, wife and daughter (Kirakos, p. 285).

(58) Gordlevskii, *Government of the Seljuqids*, pp. 36-37.

(59) Patkanov, vol. II, p. 126.

(60) F. I. Uspenskii, *The Byzantine Empire*, vol. III (Moscow, 1948) p. 605 (in Rus.).

(61) G. Hovsep'yan, *Yishatakarank' Jeragrac'*, pp. 961-962.

(62) Matenadaran ms. no. 2075, p. 5616.

(63) B. Grekov and A. Iakubovskii, *The Golden Horde* (Leningrad, 1937) pp. 103 (in Rus.).

(64) H. Manandyan, *Critical Survey*, vol. 3 p. 220.

(65) Matenadaran ms. no. 663 p. 249b.

(66) A. G. Galstyan, *Smbat Sparapet* (Erevan, 1962) p. 51 (in Arm.). As we have explained there, the date 1248 for Smbat's trip to Mongolia which is suggested in Smbat's *Taregirk'* is not convincing (see p. 49 n. 3).

(67) *Historia Dyn.* pp. 320-321. At our request this material was translated from the Latin by V. Pigulevskaia, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences USSR, to whom we express our thanks.

(68) Pierre Bergeron, *Voyages en Asie*, tome I, p. 154.

(69) Bloche, *Histoire des Mongols* (London, 1811) tome II p. 242.

(70) Brosset, *Histoire de la Géorgie*, tome I p. 378.

(71) Richard Henning, *Unfamiliar Lands*, trans. from German to Russian by A. V. Lisovkii, introduction by I. P. Magidovich, ed. vol III (Moscow, 1962) p. 41.

(72) I. N. Berezin, *Yarlıghs of the Khans* vol. II (Kazan, 1851).

(73) Matenadaran ms. no. 663 p. 247b.

(74) Kirakos, p. 364.

(75) Ces autres lettres étoient du Connétable d'Arménie au Roi de Cypre (Pierre Bergeron, *op. cit.*, t. I p. 154). The Russian translation of the text of this interesting letter first appeared in our *Armenian Sources on the Mongols*, pp. 64-66.